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There are many ways in which climate futures can be envisioned, such as 
global and regional climate models, scenarios of future emission trajectories, or 
pathways and visions of societal transformation. All these anticipatory practices 
aim to make the climatic future knowable in the present. In so doing, they quite 
often envision a climatic future that is inherently violent: a future marked by 
disasters, wars, mass migration, turmoil, and terror. This working paper seeks 
to explain the popularity and tenacity of such violent imaginaries of (future) 
climate change in scientific research, popular culture, and political discourse. 
For this, it asks two interrelated questions: First, how do violent imaginaries of 
future climate change come about? Second, why and how do these imaginaries 
circulate and proliferate? To answer these questions, the paper provides a 
discussion of the concept of “violence” and elaborates how different forms of 
it are featured in imaginaries of future climate change. On this basis, the paper 
then traces three different modes of future-making that together produce and 
reproduce violent climate imaginaries: modeling the future, writing the future, 
and visualizing the future. Finally, the paper proposes and discusses several 
factors that could help explaining the circulation of violent climate imaginaries 
between the fields of science, fiction, and politics. These factors include the 
existence of an interdiscourse that bridges different specialized discourses, the 
broader political economy of imaginaries, interpersonal relations between actors 
in different fields, and the coproduction of dominant imaginaries with broader 
technological developments.
Keywords: anticipation; climate change; future; knowledge politics; violence
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There are many ways in which climate futures can be envisioned, such as 
global and regional climate models, scenarios of future emission trajectories, 
or pathways and visions of societal transformation (Yusoff and Gabrys 2011). 
In recent years, artistic representations of a climate-changed world have in-
creasingly emerged in terms of for instance art installations, literature, and film 
(see Nikoleris et al. 2017, 2019). In literary fiction, an increasing body of works 
speculates about the future implications of climate change. 
Anticipatory practices aim to make the climatic future knowable. At the same 
time, climate change at the same time fundamentally alters the stories we tell 
about the future. The grand narratives of liberal modernity, with their promise of 
unlimited growth and prosperity, have collapsed. After the “death of utopia” (Gray 
2007), global warming is now radically limiting the horizons of the future. As Ghosh 
(2016) has argued, there remains a “crisis of imagination” throughout most of 
the political and cultural sphere. The human imagination, it seems, fails to grasp 
the sheer magnitude of the transformation that our species has set in motion. If 
the anticipated effects of climate change seem incredible, they become harder 
to depict in documentary work or realist-oriented fiction – and even within Inte- 
grated Assessment Models of climate futures. There is thus a general insufficiency 
– in audience, representation, and mode – in current climate imaginaries.
A crucial sign of this crisis of imagination is how violence is featured in many 
social imaginaries of (future) climate change. Either climate change is depicted 
as an apocalyptic threat that will bring natural disasters, unrest, disease, and war 
upon humanity (Methmann and Rothe 2012), or alternatively it is imagined as a 
gradual process that allows for a smooth and nonviolent transformation toward 
a post-carbon future. Slow and creeping forms of violence that are less visible 
and harder to narrate than major disasters or global ecological breakdown are 
seldom part of our collective imagination of climate futures. Mahony and Beck 
discuss the question of why certain imaginaries of the future become dominant 
and stick around “even after they may have been thoroughly debunked or 
deconstructed” (2019). We hold that violent imaginaries of climate change that 
envision the future in catastrophic terms are particularly “sticky.” For example, 
the alarmist warnings of a coming flood of climate migrants have long been 
debunked by scholarship that demonstrates the complexity of climate change-
migration interlinkages (Boas et al. 2019). Nevertheless, such imaginaries still 
dominate large parts of the public and political discourse. 
Introduction
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Yet, violent imaginaries of future climate change are not only particularly “sticky” 
they are also highly mobile – traveling between the fields of science, popular 
culture, and politics. In the 1970s, for example, the publication of the Club of 
Rome’s “Limits to Growth” not only impacted on national and international 
environmental agendas but also found its way into popular culture. Artistic and 
literary representations of the environmental apocalypse, on the contrary, have 
found resonance in policy debates on the security implications of climate change 
(Rothe 2016; Stripple 2017).
This working paper builds on a workshop that took place at the Institute of 
Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg (IFSH) in 
February 2019.1 Dwelling on the discussions at the workshop and the work done 
by its participants, it seeks to explain both the tenacity and mobility of violent 
imaginaries of climate change.
For this, it poses two interrelated questions: First, how do violent imaginaries of 
future climate change come about? This question addresses the practices and 
methods of anticipating future climate change as well as the actors and institutions 
behind them. Second, turning to the mechanisms of their circulation, it is asked: 
Why and how do these imaginaries circulate and proliferate? The working paper 
contributes to the existing literature on discourses and imaginaries of climate 
change in several ways. First, it offers a theoretical discussion of different types 
of violence in future imaginaries of climate change. Second, it analyzes how 
violent climate imaginaries are produced through different forms of future-
making. Third, it develops a typology of preliminary circulation mechanisms that 
could help explain why some imaginaries of climate change become circulated 
while others do not.
To meet these goals, the initial part of the working paper introduces, first, the 
notion of “climate imaginaries” and discusses how different forms of violence 
become articulated in traveling imaginaries of climate change. Then, second, 
it proposes a typology of three different forms of future-making: writing climate 
futures, modeling climate futures, and visualizing climate futures. Each of these 
three forms of future-making is enacted within a distinct “anticipatory regime” 
(Granjou et al. 2017) – that is, networks of actors, practices, technologies, 
institutions, and ideas that together render an uncertain future “knowable” in 
the present (Yusoff and Gabrys 2011). The third part of the paper briefly 
elaborates on the political implications of the climate imaginaries produced 
through these forms of future-making, and discusses how they travel between 
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the fields of science, fiction, and politics. The fourth and final section concludes 
by outlining the contours of an emerging research field on violent imaginaries 
of climate change.
The concept of “imaginaries” refers to the way in which human societies make 
sense of their environment and their own place in the world. Imaginaries of the 
future reduce the complexity of (social) reality and provide orientation by knitting 
past events into coherent historical narratives. Social imaginaries can be defined 
as semiotic systems that give meaning to events, and shape practices and lived 
experiences (Nikoleris and Chertkovskaya 2019; see also, Jessop 2004; Taylor 
2003). Three important qualifications help to further sharpen the concept of 
imaginaries. First, imaginaries have to be distinguished from individually held 
beliefs or assumptions. Social imaginaries are intersubjectively shared by a 
given community, and thus historically and geographically contextual (Taylor 
2003). They are produced and reproduced through the common set of symbols, 
emblematic images, stories, legends, myths, or powerful icons shared by a given 
discursive community (McQueen 2018: 52).
Second, imaginaries are not opposed to but rather crucially interlinked with 
other forms of “world-making,” for example through scientific research. As 
Jasanoff and Kim (2015) argue, imaginaries are coproduced with scientific 
and technological developments. This means that, on the one hand, scientific 
findings – for example on future climate change – influence and shape how 
humans imagine their environment. On the other, social imaginaries also find 
their way into technical and scientific developments. For example, intelligent 
machines existed as a social imaginary long before artificial intelligence became 
technically feasible due to increased computing power, cloud computing, and 
other related developments (that were in part driven by the social imaginaries of 
AI in the past). Third, the notion of the imaginary does not follow a naïve idealism 
– imaginaries of climate change are not mere mental or linguistics products 
existing independent of the external world. Rather, as Yusoff and Gabrys stress, 
the imagination is “a site of interplay between material and perceptual worlds, 
where concepts cohere, forces pull and attract, and things, discourses, subjects, 
and objects are framed, contested, and brought into being” (2011: 517).
The Futurology of Climate Change 
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Following these theoretical assumptions, climate imaginaries can be understood 
as collectively shared sets of beliefs, narratives, and storylines that make sense 
of the uncertain future state of Planet Earth. Climate imaginaries, then, are 
“idealized visions of the future” (Levy and Spicer 2013: 662-663) that define 
which futures are thinkable and desirable, and thus also shape the political 
choices made in the present (Jasanoff 2015). Imaginaries hence provide tools 
for envisioning not only alternative futures, but also ways of how to get there 
from where we are now. As the future in the Anthropocene is highly uncertain 
and crucially dependent on the human action taken in the coming decades, 
there is a multiplicity of competing climate imaginaries. These range from more 
optimistic imaginaries of a post-fossil fuel world, in which dangerous climate 
change has been successfully mitigated, to dystopian imaginaries of climate 
breakdown and accompanying civilizational collapse.
DIMENSIONS OF VIOLENCE
As outlined in the introduction, social imaginaries of future climate change 
often envision the latter as a violent process – for example as a source of war 
and societal collapse. However, as Nikoleris and Chertkovskaya (2019) argue, 
violence is not a unique feature of dystopian future imaginaries as it can – in 
more subtle ways – also be part of more utopian visions of the future. However, 
violence is itself a highly contested concept. Any further theorization of violent 
imaginaries of climate change thus has to be clear about the notion of violence 
even being employed. 
In the described futurology of climate change, in which social imaginaries are 
produced, reproduced, and circulated, violence can occur at various levels. On 
the one hand, violence can be the subject of social imaginaries. This is the case 
if social imaginaries envision the future in predominantly violent terms – as in 
dystopian visions of the future. On the other hand, social imaginaries can also 
be a source or medium of violence themselves. Imaginaries become part of 
knowledge struggles about the appropriate representation of the future. These 
knowledge struggles are inherently political – and thus linked to power and 
violence – as they are about the question of who defines what is to be taken for 
granted within a given society. Dominant imaginaries of societal futures suppress 
or marginalize alternative imaginaries and knowledges – a process that post- 
and decolonial scholars call “epistemic violence” (Spivak 1988). O’Lear (2016), 
for example, demonstrates how the reliance on Global Circulation Models 
(GCMs) by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) narrowed 
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down the imaginative scope of global climate politics. The resulting techno-
scientific notion of climate change “reduces climate to measurable, quantifiable 
observations about environmental systems” (O’Lear 2016: 5). This, according 
to O’Lear, fostered technocratic approaches to monitoring and managing 
greenhouse gas emissions at the level of the United Nations, while silencing 
more radical ideas about rethinking society and restructuring economic 
systems (ibid: 8). 
Works that discuss the relationship between climate change and violence often 
draw on a re-reading of Galtung’s (1969) seminal work on structural violence. 
Galtung prominently distinguished between personal and structural forms of 
violence. Personal violence comes closest to the common understanding of 
violence, and refers to any action by a human being that has a direct and personal 
negative effect on another person’s physical and/or mental wellbeing. Structural 
violence, on the contrary, is an impersonal form of violence that results from 
unequal power relations and structural injustices. Whenever systemic conditions 
impede the actual realization of people’s theoretical potential, one can speak 
of a form of structural violence. Galtung’s impersonal notion of violence allows 
us to relate the concept of violence to climate change. In fact, an increasing 
number of scholars are now discussing climate change – present and future 
– as a form of structural violence (Bonds 2016; Hobbs-Morgan 2017; Solnit 
2014). Climate change, in this sense, is an impersonal force that increases 
human suffering and limits the life chances and potentials of many populations 
across the globe. Considering that the exposure to environmental risks is highly 
unequally distributed and depends on the race, gender, class, and geographic 
location of affected populations, a structural notion of violence directly links up 
with questions of inequality and climate justice (Davies 2019: 1539).
At the same time, however, Galtung’s notion of violence runs into a number of 
problems when it is confronted with the complex spatio-temporality of climate 
change and the Anthropocene (Hobbs-Morgan 2017: 81). When Galtung de-
veloped his notion of structural violence he was referring to populations suffering 
from the violence of repressive regimes, colonial powers, or economic programs 
of international organizations. Due to the complexity of causes and effects, 
of responsibilities and agencies, that marks climate change and its impacts, 
the differentiation between personal and structural violence is becoming 
increasingly difficult to maintain. Climate change is both fast and slow, personal 
and structural, human-made and more-than-human. Furthermore, Galtung’s 
structuralist perspective leaves little room for notions of agency, thus implicitly 
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turning victims of structural violence into anonymous masses deprived of any 
agency. Thus, while concepts such as Galtung’s are helpful in structuring the 
forms of violence encountered in future imaginaries of climate change, they are 
at the same time challenged and transcended by imaginaries of climate change. 
With his notion of slow violence, Rob Nixon (2011) updates Galtung’s idea of 
structural violence for times of environmental change. With Galtung he shares 
the “concern with social justice, hidden agency, and certain forms of violence 
that are imperceptible” (ibid: 10). Nixon then adds an explicit temporal focus 
to this definition “to keep front and center the representational challenges 
and imaginative dilemmas posed not just by imperceptible violence but by 
imperceptible change whereby violence is decoupled from its original causes 
by the workings of time” (ibid: 11). The representational challenges mentioned 
by Nixon in this quote are crucial for the subject of violent climate imaginaries. 
The slow, delayed, and often invisible effects of climate change are much harder 
to be narrated than spectacular, sudden forms of violence – and thus the former 
seldom find their ways into collective imaginaries of the future. 
FUTURE CLIMATE IMAGINARIES
Equipped with this differentiated notion of violence, one can take a closer look 
at dominant future imaginaries of climate change. According to Levy and Spicer 
(2013), there are four major competing climate imaginaries: climate apocalypse, 
fossil fuels forever, techno-market, and sustainable lifestyles. In the following, we 
will briefly outline these future imaginaries and discuss their respective relations 
to violence.
One of the most salient and powerful climate imaginaries is what Alison McQueen 
describes as the “apocalyptic imaginary” (2018: 54). The latter draws on the 
metaphoric and pictorial world of the Judeo-Christian apocalypse (Fagan 2017; 
Methmann and Rothe 2012; Skrimshire 2010). It revolves around the belief in an 
ecological collapse caused by anthropogenic climate change, to be followed by 
societal breakdown. In pictorial terms, it paints the image of a dysfunctional and 
chaotic world. In climate change discourse, the apocalyptic imaginary opposes 
other collective imaginaries of global warming as an incremental and slow pro-
cess of change. The apocalyptic imaginary creates a sense of urgency to mobi-
lize for decisive and immediate political action in the present.
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In the case of the apocalyptic imaginary, the relationship to forms of violence is 
immediately given and clear. Early Judeo-Christian apocalyptic texts were written 
at times when the respective communities of faith were experiencing increased 
bodily suffering and repression. In this situation, apocalyptic texts gave meaning 
to the increased suffering of believers – in that it reinterpreted the experience of 
violence as divine punishment for the original sin of human beings. Furthermore, 
and this is crucial, these texts carried the promise of humanity’s collective sal-
vation (and thus the freedom from all violence) in the aftermath of the Last Jud-
gment. The social imaginary of the climate apocalypse draws on these original 
texts and reinterprets them in relation to a looming climate catastrophe (Meth-
mann and Rothe 2012). In this imaginary, a future humankind will face direct 
and personal forms of violence as the so-called secondary impacts of climate 
change – that is, violent conflict, mass migration, political turmoil, human insecu-
rity, and similar, brought about by climate-related extreme events and disasters 
(e.g. Burke et al. 2009). This future imaginary of a world of mass-scale climate 
violence is often used by Western policymakers or members of civil society to 
mobilize for decisive climate action in the present.
The “fossil fuels forever” imaginary depicts a world in which fossil fuels continue to 
be seen as a core source of economic prosperity and wellbeing. As Nikoleris and 
Chertkovskaya (2019) argue, there are two forms of violence that undergird this 
future imaginary – both of which would become manifest in the process of future 
pipeline construction. On the one hand, there is the structural and slow violence 
caused by the fossil fuel economy, which maximizes profits while externalizing 
costs (Bonds 2016). The slow violence of the petroleum age becomes manifest 
and visible, for example, in the polluted landscapes around coal and oil extraction 
sites, or the detrimental effects of global warming on livelihoods in developing 
countries (Nixon 2011). On the other hand, “disputes along the pipeline” (Barry 
2013) also come with direct forms of violence against protesters – and thus 
those that actively resist the imaginary of infinite fossil fuel-based growth. Both 
forms of violence of the extractivist age are already manifest in the present. 
One can trace these forms of violence back to early European colonialism and 
the exploitation and destruction of indigenous peoples’ environments (Yusoff 
2018). In the fossil fuels forever imaginary, however, these forms are not only 
extended into the future but further intensified. For as conventional oil and coal 
sources will be depleted in the foreseeable future, the fossil fuel industry will 
increasingly rely on unconventional sources like fracked natural gas, tar sands 
oil, and methane hydrate. These unconventional sources have an even bigger 
negative environmental impact than conventional fossil fuels, and bear huge 
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potential for local protest and conflict – thus potentially requiring repressive 
measures to be ensured.
Another prominent climate imaginary is that of “green tech.” This imaginary 
envisions a future in which a technology-driven transformation of the world 
economy allows us to combat climate change without any major sacrifices in 
terms of lifestyle. Green tech is an optimistic future imaginary that dwells on the 
current discourse of ecological modernization and the hope of innovations in the 
realm of renewable energy, genetic modification (for example of climate-resilient 
crops), or carbon-dioxide-removal technologies. The green-tech imaginary does 
not know any violence. Eco-modernists reject alarmist projections of the future 
just as they do calls for forceful state intervention to steer the socioeconomic 
transition toward decarbonization. Hence, what is interesting in our view is how 
(legitimate and illegitimate) forms of violence are rendered invisible and written 
out of the green-tech future imaginary. 
Rendering the violence of socioeconomic transformations invisible can then itself 
be seen as a form of epistemic violence. Many green-tech and environmental- 
development projects across the world are inherently violent. Examples include 
the construction of large-scale dams, or conflicts and displacement related 
to the mining of cobalt and lithium required for the production of batteries for 
electric cars. Many futuristic eco-modernist projects, such as the construction of 
a hybrid “forest city” in Malaysia by Chinese investors, are highly contested and 
marked by their huge potential for social conflict (Moser 2018). Furthermore, 
eco-modernist solutions to the environmental crisis rely heavily on digital 
technologies including AI, the internet of things, big data, and smart cities. 
What is written out of the green-tech imaginary of the future are thus all forms 
of surveillance and risks to privacy and individual freedom inherent in smart city 
projects such as Sidewalk Labs – a highly disputed urban innovation company 
owned by Alphabet (Google’s parent company).
A final dominant climate imaginary is that of “sustainable livelihoods.” This 
revolves around the notion of degrowth, and propagates minimalism and restraint 
– thus offering an optimistic, or more hopeful, outlook on the future while at 
the same time rejecting the technological optimism of green tech. Degrowth 
can in this sense be understood as the “descaling of biophysical throughput, 
deaccumulation and anti-productivism, and aimed at bringing together the 
alternatives not tied in these” (Chertkovskaya and Paulsson 2016). The current 
Fridays for Future movement, in which millions of students across the globe 
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have begun to call for more ambitious climate action, is very much influenced 
by this imaginary. While the students on the one hand address policymakers 
as the ones that have the power to initiate structural change, they on the other 
stress the necessity of individual restraint and lifestyle changes. Although the 
sustainable livelihoods scenario is a decidedly anti-violent one, violence still plays 
an important role – as something which the imaginary aims to combat (Nikoleris 
and Chertkovskaya 2019). In this imaginary, climate change and its violent 
ramifications are mitigated through voluntary action and self-reflective behavioral 
change, made possible through a consensual rearticulation of wellbeing and 
“the good life.” The daily lives of future humans in the sustainable livelihoods 
imaginary differ considerably from ours today. Future humans, in this imaginary, 
are less materialistic and live simpler lives, in line with a radical reinterpretation 
of what constitutes a good life. Conservative political commentators, however, 
often frame the sustainable livelihoods imaginary as a threat to freedom and 
prosperity (Levy and Spicer 2013). 
In sum, several features of the relations between violence and future imaginaries 
become apparent in these four discussed ideal-types. First, future imaginaries 
of climate change often focus on large-scale direct violence (such as climate-
induced conflicts) occurring as a result of abrupt climate change. On the 
contrary, slow forms of violence – which are less visible, and manifest at the 
local level – are silenced. Furthermore, in all discussed imaginaries violence is 
featured as illegitimate and thus something to be avoided. This follows a Western 
liberal notion of violence that ignores the phenomenon being a legitimate part of 
social struggles – for example indigenous ones against the further destruction 
of their lifeworlds. Finally, future imaginaries of climate change exhibit forms of 
epistemic violence themselves. As imaginaries of the future define the horizons 
of the thinkable, they delimit and shape the possibilities for political action in 
the present. Thus the dominance of a certain future imaginary, for example 
apocalyptic climate change, might foreclose potential alternate pathways into 
the future, and could thereby hinder the realization of certain people’s potential. 
This preliminary analysis of violent imaginaries of climate change demonstrates 
the importance of questions of representation and legitimation. Who defines 
what counts as violence, and what not? Who defines which forms of violence are 
deemed legitimate, and which not? These questions cannot be answered a priori, 
but have to be considered in any study of future climate change imaginaries. 
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DESIRING PAST FUTURES
As shown above, violent climate imaginaries are part of a “futurology of climate 
change” (Baldwin et al. 2014). They are produced by and circulated through 
anticipatory assemblages that seek to render an uncertain future calculable, 
imaginable, and thus tangible. However, in trying to project the future, 
anticipatory assemblages crucially rely on knowledges and discourses of the 
past. One key element of the current politics of the future in the discourse on 
climate change and the Anthropocene is the desire of certain actors to project 
(failed) political projects of the past into the future. This invocation of past futures 
takes two different forms: On the one hand, there are political projects whose 
future imaginaries are simply extensions of the present modernist project. Boyd 
(2019), for example, scrutinizes how discourses on loss and damage (Boyd et 
al. 2017) – that is, the compensation for the future losses of those that are most 
hit by climate change – are shaped by imaginaries such as eco-modernism or 
sustainable development. The fossil fuels forever imaginary outlined earlier 
would be another example of how the future is imagined as an extension of the 
modernist present.
On the other hand, there are utopian as well as dystopian – violent as well as anti-
violent – imaginaries that dwell on premodern political ideas and project them 
into the future. It is important to study the orders cocreated by these updates of 
(pre)modernity, and to scrutinize how they intensify or transform the violence that 
they inherit. Following Hentschel (2019), one could understand contemporary 
right-wing discourses as a form of desiring past futures. Assembling an eclectic 
mix of ideological sources – from German philosophers, to Mahatma Ghandi, 
to Greenpeace – contemporary right-wing thinkers challenge the – in their 
view – unemotional, technocratic, and unpassionate nature of politics today. 
Romancing about the return to a premodern world of grand political emotions, 
such thinkers seek to “rewild” the political. In so doing they draw on metaphors 
and icons of natural disasters, which represent the untamed, the wild, and the 
uncontrollable; in short, the emotions that the New Right is seeking to revitalize. 
One particularly prominent image of this desire is that of the volcano. Being 
a powerful icon of revolutionary upheaval, the volcano symbolizes a violent 
rupture that does away with existing elites in an extension of human capabilities. 
The cynicism of evoking a destructive force reveals an uncanny view of power, 
in which masculinity is supposedly rediscovered vis-à-vis civilizations that render 
men soft. “Becoming barbarian,” in the words of Donovan (2016) – whose 
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writings represent an emerging misogynic, anti-gay, discriminatory, masculinist 
counterculture – becomes desirable. 
The case of right-wing thought and its invocation of natural wilderness is a 
good example of the crucial role of myth in the creation of future imaginaries. 
In this case, it is the myth of a pristine state of nature lying at the heart of the 
political – one that in the minds of New Right thinkers has been suppressed 
by the political bureaucrats and technocrats of the modern age. Essebo (2019) 
inquires further into the role of myth in climate policy – or better, in the Donald 
Trump administration’s “nonresponse response” to climate change. Political 
myth, according to Essebo, is a condensed narrative that mobilizes knowledge 
of the past to make sense of the present and future. It draws on a plot that has 
a clear beginning and end, and offers both an explanation of the causes of a 
given problem as well as a potential solution to it (Essebo 2018). Importantly, a 
myth cannot be proven wrong: myths naturalize behavior so that they have the 
“power of the obvious,” where truth or lie are not relevant categories anymore. 
Myths alleviate fear by offering a kind of salvific promise: those who welcome 
an identified path and follow it will be alright (while those who do not will 
experience the very troubles that they fear). Essebo shows how Trump uses 
different political myths to translate the abstract fears surrounding future threats 
such as climate change into concrete ones related to poverty or unemployment. 
In this imaginary, climate change is reframed as an issue of the wealthy, liberal 
elite, while the real threats to American workers – such as Chinese dominance 
of the global market – remain ignored. Harnessing the power myth, Trump has 
successfully convinced his followers that they will be fine if they simply follow his 
path into the future.
Figure 1. The volcano  
as political symbol in  
the French Revolution  
(Desperret, 1833)
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How are imaginaries of climate futures produced? Clearly, social imaginaries do 
not emerge in a vacuum – they are context-dependent and historically contingent. 
Dominant social imaginaries differ from country to country, and change over time. 
Social imaginaries are related to political power, but they are not solely shaped by 
political or societal elites. Social imaginaries do not evolve in isolation from nor in 
opposition to scientific findings. However, they are also not entirely determined 
by scientific and technological progress. They are influenced by popular 
culture, art, and literature (Farzin 2017). They are produced and reproduced by 
the mass media – and increasingly through social media and online networks 
(Arlt et al. 2017; Walter et al. 2019). They are embedded in the aforementioned 
futurology of climate change, but at the same time dwell on knowledges of the 
past – including myths and traditional knowledge. In the following, we provide 
a preliminary cartography of this futurology of climate change by distinguishing 
between three ideal-types of future-making. These can be understood as sets 
of practices through which imaginaries of future climate change are produced: 
modeling violent futures, writing violent futures, and visualizing violent futures.2 
These sets of practices cut across established societal fields and disciplinary 
boundaries. In fact, they often bring actors from heterogeneous backgrounds 
together – as we will see in the following sections.
MODELING VIOLENT FUTURES
Social imaginaries of climate change evolve in close relation to other technological 
and scientific developments. A perfect example of this coproduction of science 
and technology on the one hand and climate imaginaries on the other is that 
of computer modeling (Edwards 2010). Already in the early twentieth century 
meteorologists developed numerical models to develop weather forecasts. 
Such models used mathematic equations to simulate the fluid dynamics of the 
atmosphere, but could only provide local, short-term forecasts. This changed 
with the advancement in computer technologies occurring in the aftermath of 
World War II, as well as with scientific advancements such as the emergence of 
chaos theory in the 1960s. Embedded in the Cold War rivalry of the two global 
superpowers, geoscientists soon began to use computer modeling techniques 
to project the future dynamics of global systems – including population growth, 
agriculture, and global food systems, and, since the 1980s, manmade climate 
change. From the very beginning, imaginaries of a violent future were inherently 
linked to the development of these models.
Modes of Future-Making
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For example, the prominent “Limits to Growth” study of the Club of Rome 
(Meadows et al. 1972) is often quoted as the first authorized source of apocalyptic 
imaginaries of environmental change (Stripple 2019). The bleak scenarios 
produced by the report, two of which predict civilizational collapse before the 
end of the twenty-first century, were based on a computer model developed by 
MIT researchers called “World 3.” The researchers used a supercomputer to 
simulate a global resource system based on (data on) five factors: population 
growth, agricultural production, resource depletion, industrial output, and 
pollution.3 The Club of Rome report in the following years became a major 
source of inspiration for many pop culture and literary imaginaries of ecological 
collapse. At the same time, however, the computer simulation was itself based 
on future imaginaries – in particular the prophecies of Thomas Robert Malthus, 
an eighteenth-century mathematician and professor of History and Political 
Economy at the East India Company’s college in Haileybury, Hertfordshire. 
Malthus had prominently argued that unchecked population growth enabled 
through the consumption of nonrenewable resources would lead to resource 
Figure 2. IBM Console used by Meteorologist in 1965 
(US Weather Bureau, 1965)
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scarcities, famines, and ultimately social turmoil and chaos. This Malthusian 
narrative crucially informed the development of the World 3 model, and the 
selection of data that was used to feed it.
A further example of the intimate relationship between computer modeling 
and social imaginaries of the future is the discourse on the climatic effects of 
a global thermonuclear war (Scheffran 2019a). In the 1980s, researchers in the 
United States and the Soviet Union were using computer models to simulate 
the atmospheric impact of multiple nuclear explosions. Concretely, they used 
global circulation models to simulate how soot particles – released through 
the firestorms of nuclear explosions – would change the Earth’s radiation 
balance and thus cool down the global climate. Researchers used global 
circulation models to anticipate how particles would circulate through the global 
atmosphere. The models used to simulate the circulation of radioactive fallout 
or soot crucially fed into the development of the first global circulation models 
simulating anthropogenic climate change (Dörries 2011). 
Yet, even beyond this technical level there was an important effect of nuclear 
war research on social imaginaries of climate change. Thus the “nuclear winter” 
metaphor had tremendous resonance in public and political discourse, and 
thereby helped popularize the idea of manmade climate change among a 
broader audience (Edwards 2010: 380). The nuclear winter story was featured 
prominently in popular culture as well – for example in the 1983 TV movie The 
Day After. As Scheffran (2019b) argues, it was this apocalyptic imaginary that 
would be later rearticulated in discourses on climate change and its security 
implications. For example, Schwartz and Randall (2003) published a report 
on An Abrupt Climate Change Scenario and Its Implications for United States 
National Security. In the report, which was commissioned by the US Department 
of Defense, the two futurologists describe the scenario of an abrupt global 
cooling caused by the collapse of the Gulf Stream. Only one year later, The Day 
after Tomorrow – a Hollywood disaster movie based on the same global cooling 
scenario – would be screened in cinemas across the globe (see Hobbs-Morgan 
2017). The links between nuclear winter research and climate change are a 
perfect example of the coproduction of technical and scientific developments 
and social imaginaries. Long before research began to use computer models 
to simulate the climatic effects of nuclear weapons, the “nuclear winter” existed 
as an imaginary in literary fiction. The idea was first expressed in Paul Anderson 
and F. N. Waldrop’s postwar story “Tomorrow‘s Children” (1947), later followed 
up on by Anderson in his 1961 novel Twilight World (Bartter 1988).
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More recently, researchers have begun to apply computer models to investigate 
the potential links between climate change and conflict (as well as other 
potential security threats, including migration). For this, they increasingly rely 
on integrated models that seek to model the complex interaction between 
physical and social systems – for example regional climate change and social 
systems in potential conflict regions. Furthermore, agent-based models are 
used to simulate social systems not on the basis of general system laws but 
of modeling other individual choices by their constituting actors. Yet scientific 
projections of future climatic states not only depend on formal techniques like 
modeling but are also informed by powerful metaphors – including those of 
the “tipping point” or the “risk cascade” (Scheffran 2019b). Such metaphors 
are required to cope with and reduce the uncertainties involved in computer 
models of complex dynamic systems, such as the Earth system. Both metaphors 
express the idea that feedback loops between critical parts of the Earth system, 
such as permafrost in the Arctic or tropical rainforests, might push the Earth 
system onto an irreversible pathway toward catastrophic climate change (Steffen 
et al. 2018). In these scenarios, instability is a qualitative change of state due to 
certain events, where there is no return to the previous state – such as when 
“peace turns into war.”
A second powerful collective symbol is that of the “threat multiplier” in research 
on the security implications of climate change (Ningelgen 2018; Scheffran et 
al. 2014). Since scholars in Peace and Conflict Studies hardly ever scrutinize 
climate change as a potential resource for developing cooperative structures in 
political settings prone to conflict, this line of research implies violence in both 
the scenarios that it depicts and the episteme it evokes. Interestingly, whenever 
the exact relationship between climate change and conflict remains uncertain 
and complex (see Scheffran et al. 2012), empirical studies of the climate-conflict 
link turn to the concept of the threat multiplier (Rothe 2016; Scheffran 2019a). In 
short, this metaphorical concept expresses the idea that, due to the complexities 
of social and ecological systems (and their interaction), climate change does 
not itself represent a direct cause of conflict or other insecurities. However, 
it could make other existing conflicts and insecurities worse – hence being a 
threat multiplier.
Another crucial link between future imaginaries and computer models is the field 
of energy policy. Aykut (2019) proposes the notion of “predictive assemblage” 
to grasp the combination of heterogeneous techniques of future-making and 
related knowledges. Within these assemblages, climate imaginaries – ranging 
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from dystopian to business-as-usual and techno-optimistic imaginaries – are 
developed through scenario techniques. By translating these imaginaries into 
computer models they would, however, become black-boxed. Models, according 
to Aykut, are a way of creating a certain semiotics about what needs to be done, 
and how. They require a specific literacy, and require staff trained in interpreting 
them. This skillset is highly exclusive. At the same time, they co-constitute public 
policies as well as enable and legitimize new types of intervention. By making 
strategic choices, for example regarding energy demand, the models would 
exclude other, more radical imaginaries, such as on a decentralized energy 
production. These choices tend to stabilize existing sociotechnical regimes, 
reinforce cognitive lock-ins, and privilege certain people to consider and co-
implement particular future imaginaries. Violence is thus not only a part of 
the imaginary produced by the models (e.g. on apocalyptic futures) but also 
inherent to the model itself – as it excludes certain political demands and ideas, 
and thereby limits the horizons of the possible in the present.
WRITING VIOLENT FUTURES
In a recent study, Galafassi et al. (2018) concluded that popular culture and art – 
particularly narrative, visual, and performative art – is a powerful way of fostering 
a shared understanding of the challenges posed by climate change, as well as 
of promoting transformative climate action as a component of social learning. 
As artistic imaginaries make climate change culturally meaningful and enable 
emotional encounters, they allow people to connect with climate futures on a 
personal and affective level.
Within the field of literature, an increasing body of novels is dealing with 
speculative climate change futures. These writers imagine future worlds in which 
we are living with, or mitigating, climate change. While many of these represent 
dystopian and often violent futures, others paint more optimistic scenarios – by 
imagining alternative societies in which we find new, innovative ways of living 
in a warming and carbon-constrained world. The ability of literature to plant 
something into the reader’s imagination is a powerful tool. In fact, at least since 
the summer of 2018, there seems to have been a major shift in the dominant 
imaginaries of climate change in many Western societies. That summer, when 
wildfires, extreme heat, droughts, and flash floods were all plaguing the Northern 
Hemisphere, is often recognized as the “end of denial” vis-à-vis climate change. 
And yet, even if there seems to be emerging societal consent about the severity 
of climate change, there has been little alteration in the actual politics of climate 
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change. Global emissions are still on the rise. In many countries – including 
major greenhouse gas emitters such as the US, Brazil, or Italy – climate-skeptic 
politicians have been elected into office.
A closer look at the contemporary state of literature could help explaining these 
discrepancies between public perception of and political action on climate 
change. Ghosh prominently diagnosed, as noted, a fundamental crisis of 
imagination in current climate change discourses. Thus even if we no longer 
deny climate change, it seems that we still do not have the ability to change 
anything – because of a lack of a future vision, a lack of imagination. As Tenngart 
(2019), referencing Astrid Lindgren, argues: the crisis of imagination is probably 
also one of literature.
One symptom of this lack of imagination in contemporary literature is the way 
in which violence is featured in the growing literary field of “climate fiction” 
(Goodbody and Johns-Putra 2018). Writers often fall back on anthropocentric 
and antagonistic notions of violence. In such a plot, subjects are easy to tell 
from objects. There are heroes, antiheroes, and victims. Humanity is opposed 
to nature. Complex and nonlinear temporalities are forced into a linear flow of 
time, in which the past, present, and future exist as clearly demarcated states. 
Narrating systemic and distributed forms of agency, however, is a challenge 
for writers: How do we tell stories when there are no enemies to fight? This 
makes particular forms of violence that do not have a clearly identifiable actor 
– including, as outlined earlier, structural and slow violence – difficult to narrate 
in climate fiction (see also Hobbs-Morgan 2017). As Raven notes, a narrative (in 
fiction or cinema) is not simply a story or a plot – “a story (or plot) is a sequence 
of events in time and space, while a narrative is a subjective account of that 
sequence of events” (Raven 2016: 51). Accounts of violence have, hence, to 
be fitted in into a linear sequence of events experienced and narrated from a 
particular subject position. Furthermore, (Western/Anglophone) narratology 
lacks the tools to tell stories that depart from the established hero versus 
antihero actor scheme (Raven 2019). The structural and slow violence of climate 
change, however, are embedded in complex and nonlinear causal chains, in 
which no single “perpetrator” or driver can be identified. Traditional Western 
narratology, then, fails to deal with this complexity, because it would necessarily 
have to break it down into a subjective experience or perspective of it (Raven 
2019). A good example is “The Carbon Diaries: 2015” by Saci Lloyd, which has 
been described as a soft-dystopian novel of the near-future that narrates the 
everyday and mundane effects of climate change (Farzin 2018). What is needed 
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are thus new kinds of narrative – ones that break with the established actor 
schemes and linear temporalities of Western narratology – and a new literacy on 
the part of both the author and the audience to write and read such narratives 
(Raven 2019). Examples can be found in non-Western indigenous fiction, where 
narratives are told from the perspective of nonhuman actors such as forests 
or rivers.
The crisis of imagination diagnosed by Gosh (2016), thus, is to some extent the 
result of structural shortcomings of writing as a method and the weakness of some 
inherited narration conventions. It is wrong to expect that fiction can show us the 
way out of the current climate political stalemate. Fiction is not able to change the 
world, nor people’s minds. Just as with other narrative forms such as scenarios, 
prototypes, and predictive models, fiction does not outline actual futures but 
“speculative and subjective depictions of possibilities yet to be realised” (Raven 
and Elahi 2015: 51). Future imaginaries constructed in contemporary fiction can, 
however, provide us with a conceptual infrastructure in which other imaginaries 
might dwell, and thus enable novel forms of political action. Tenngart (2019) 
discusses a genre that might offer such positive conceptual infrastructures: the 
“climate romance.” With its emphasis on self-identification, norm-setting, clear 
projections, as well as a positive outlook (“happy ending”) on the future, the 
climate romance could have an interesting function in providing hope and in 
guiding social and political action. While utopian narratives are not necessarily 
meant to be realizable, they provide moral and ethical direction for social 
projects and things that we aspire to (Raven 2015). An example of a climate 
romance can be found in Kim Stanley Robinson’s novel New York 2140. On the 
one hand, his narration of a future New York submerged underwater depicts a 
clearly undesirable future state of the Earth in which attempts to mitigate climate 
change have failed. On the other, it is surprisingly utopian – providing a positive 
outlook on the ability to develop adaptive capacities and rearticulate practices of 
daily life in order to cope with a changing climate (see Brady 2019).
Writing as a practice not only comprises literary accounts of the future, as Islar 
(2019) reminds us. Islar analyzes violent climate imaginaries of the Himalaya 
region in the climate change impact reports of the intergovernmental think 
tank International Centre for Integrated Mountain Development (ICIMOD). 
The Himalayas, often referred to as the “water towers of Asia,” are of crucial 
importance as a water and energy source for the village communities in Nepal, 
and particularly vulnerable to climate change (Islar et al. 2017). Because of its 
complex topography, there is extensive uncertainty in climate models regarding 
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the concrete impacts on the mountains. Policy reports, including those of the 
ICIMOD, thus often draw on the technocratic language of “risk” (centered 
around notions of probability and vulnerability) to render the uncertain futures 
of the Himalaya calculable in the present. Media coverage of the region, on the 
contrary, breaks with the technical tone of this “riskification” (Corry 2012) and 
instead resorts to a discourse of securitization, presenting climate impacts on 
the Himalaya as an acute, exceptional threat with potentially global ramifications. 
Such forms of writing climatic futures are, according to Islar, problematic for 
at least three reasons: First, such depictions of climate change undermine 
the credibility of scientists, because often hypotheses are transformed into 
catastrophic/dystopic scenarios before they have even been confirmed. Second, 
the securitizing language of these scenarios is violent in itself, thus rendering 
extraordinary responses more plausible in the public eye. Third, when facts are 
translated into sensational stories and fiction, we need to think about whose 
storylines are being reproduced and circulated, and indeed whose narratives 
are being excluded. Islar’s study is thus an excellent example of how writing 
conventions and styles in different fields – here, science and mass media – 
shape and change traveling imaginaries of climate futures.
VISUALIZING VIOLENT FUTURES
As observed by McQueen (2018: 54), in his seminal work on the social imaginary 
Taylor has surprisingly “little to say about the visual dimensions of imaginaries.” 
Drawing on the work of Buck-Morss (2002), McQueen proposes an “imagistic” 
understanding of imaginary – one that accounts for the crucial role of icons, 
symbols, images, and visual metaphors in the construction of meaning in our 
world. In her work on the apocalypse as social imaginary, this allows her to trace 
how Christian apocalyptic symbols and icons become re-appropriated and 
reproduced in contemporary popular culture or political discourse. 
For the study of violent climate imaginaries, the visual dimension of these is 
equally important. As works on the “image politics of climate change” (Schneider 
and Nocke 2014) have shown, images and other visual artefacts are crucial for 
the discursive framing of environmental problems such as climate change. One 
reason for this is that climate change, at least for the majority of people living 
in Western countries, is not a manifest but a future issue. Furthermore, even 
in regions where the impacts of global warming can already be felt today, one 
cannot see or perceive climate change itself. What can be felt and perceived is 
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only the local weather; climate change, however, is a statistical weather trend 
that unfolds globally over a longer period (usually three decades or more). 
Climate change can, thus, only be sensed by proxy. Technical images including 
diagrams, charts, and figures – such as the prominent “hockey-stick graph” 
(Mann et al. 1999) – render this long-term trend visible. 
The results of scenario exercises and computer models are also often presented 
in visual rather than textual form. Data visualization has become an important 
subfield within climate science. Increasingly, animated short clips or GIFs are 
being used to communicate the findings of climate scientists. The media and 
NGOs often use proxy images, for examples ones of natural disasters and other 
humanitarian emergencies, to visually represent (future) climate change. In these 
publications we often see images of “climate victims” – women and children in 
crisis situations such as floods or droughts. Pictures of “climate refugees” – 
people of color wading through the water – are supposed to give the abstract 
phenomenon of climate change a “human face” (Methmann 2014; Methmann 
and Rothe 2014). In popular culture, movies such as The Day after Tomorrow 
draw on powerful visual metaphors – such as the previously mentioned reference 
to nuclear winter – and Christian apocalyptic symbols to narrate a story of 
apocalyptic climate change. Cartoons, comics, and other pop culture artefacts 
are used to explain the issue to a broader lay audience (Manzo 2012). These 
images and other visual or pop culture artefacts do not simply depict climate 
change in a neutral and objective way but rather they frame it in particular ones. 
Especially in the visual discourse on the Anthropocene, aerial images of human-
shaped landscapes – for example in mining areas – are taken as visualizations 
of humanity’s footprint on the planet (Demos 2017). Visual scholars such as 
Demos have criticized these monumental landscape images for aestheticizing 
and thus normalizing the effects of petrocapitalism (Demos 2015). The violence 
of these practices of extraction remains invisible in these images. Deformed and 
degraded landscapes appear as beautiful patterns and forms.
As Bleiker (2015) argues, images affect what we can see, think, and say about an 
issue (such as climate change). The visual representation of the climatic future 
is thus intrinsically political and linked to questions of power (Schneider and 
Nocke 2014). While some visual framings of climate change become dominant 
– think here of the emblematic image of the starving polar bear – other forms of 
climate visuality become hidden.
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To study the violent imaginaries of climate change, thus, requires taking a closer 
look at the visual dimension thereof. Images of violence, suffering, or existential 
threats are much more likely to invoke a certain emotive reaction on the part of 
the viewer than mere textual descriptions would. While this might be obvious in 
the case of disaster movies such as The Day after Tomorrow, it even holds true 
for technical images of climate change too. Several works have, for example, 
shown how the use of colors (red) creates a sense of risk and urgency in climate 
figures – such as the IPCC’s prominent “burning ambers” figure (Liverman 
2009). Another important characteristic of images besides the ability to transfer 
emotions is their supposed objective truth claim. Photographic pictures and 
satellite images purportedly depict the empirical reality on the ground in a direct 
and undistorted manner – “seeing is believing” (Shim 2013). Hence, visual 
artefacts can play an important role in the securitization of future issues such 
as climate change – by presenting the existence of existential threats (climate 
migration, conflict, etc.) in an apparently objective manner (Rothe 2017).
Brüggemann (2019) examines the social construction of climate futures in the 
mass media. By studying images of future climate change in German mass 
media publications since the 1980s, he observes the collective imaginary 
thereof. In the 1980s/1990s the predominant visual framing of climate change 
in the media was that of a drowning world. Under the headline “Die Klima-
Katastrophe” (“The Climate Catastrophe”), a 1986 front cover from the German 
magazine Der Spiegel for example featured a montage showing the Cologne 
Cathedral drowning in water.
This image not only creates a sense of urgency, but – together with the headline – 
furthermore gives the abstract – and at that time largely unknown – phenomenon 
of climate change concrete form. On an emotional level, the image invokes fear 
and a sense of personal attachment – by showing the destruction of one of 
Germany’s most prominent cultural icons. Brüggemann then compares this 
image to a more recent one from 2015 (see Figure 4 below). The issue is entitled 
“Der verheizte Planet,” which in German has a double-meaning – “the burned 
planet” as well as the “the used-up planet.”
The front cover shows a space image of the Earth – the Blue Marble – in flames. 
Although equally catastrophist as the image of the drowning Cathedral, this one 
of the planet in flames sends a more ambivalent message – one that links the 
existential threat to the planet to the need for and possibility of collective action 
(DeLoughrey 2015: 262). The view of the planet from space – through the so-
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called planetary gaze – portrays simultaneously the beauty and the fragility of 
the Earth. It constructs a moral responsibility too: humankind has set the planet 
on fire. It is in fact the only species that could do so, just as it is the only one that 
can view the planet from the outside. Thus, it also has a moral and political duty 
to save the planet through collective action.
Linné (2019) paints an even more nuanced – and ambivalent – picture of the 
relationship between future images, violence, and climate change. He explores 
how veganism constitutes itself as a nonviolent political movement centered 
around demands such as animal rights and climate justice. Linné shows how 
vegan political actors use horrific images of future food to express and illustrate 
a twofold form of violence within the present food system. On the one hand, 
industrialized agriculture is built on a system of violence that treats living beings 
as mere commodities (Linné, 2016). On the other, meat consumption is a 
significant contributor to global warming – which again poses a threat to many 
nonhuman species on the planet. Thus, veganism in the West is very much built 
on the idea of nonviolence. However, while activism around veganism addresses 
violence and is at the same time performed in nonviolent ways (e.g. being there 
in solidarity rather than blocking or using violence), the veganism movement is 
Figure 3. A 1986 front cover from Der Spiegel (1986)
Figure 4. A 2015 front cover from Der Spiegel (2015)
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in fact to a large extent based on communicating violence. Prominent examples 
are pictures or videos secretly taken in factory farms that show suffering 
animals. These images have a strong emotional appeal, and are meant to wake 
the broader public up to the violence of the capitalist food system. As Linné 
demonstrates by showing images of the political struggles occurring around the 
production of cow’s milk in New Zealand in 2015 (Figure 5) or via the example 
of the Animal Save Movement, an international network of activists documenting 
animals arriving in trucks at slaughterhouses (the pictures then being posted 
online), forms of violence – for example epistemic – are apparent in several 
depictions of vegan food futures.
Figure 5. Image from the SAFE (Save Animals from Exploitation) Campaign  
“The Dark Side of the New Zealand Dairy Industry” (Medium 2015).
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In the previous two sections of the working paper we have outlined the concept 
of violent climate imaginaries and described the different knowledge practices 
and techniques through which they are produced. In the remaining part of the 
paper we now take a closer look at the politics of climate imaginaries, and 
discuss the question of how and why they travel and circulate between different 
knowledge domains and social fields. The first part of this question addresses 
the mechanisms and channels of circulation, translation, and transfer that allow 
certain imaginaries to spread in the first place. The second part of the question, 
meanwhile, is related to issues of power and agency: Why do some imaginaries 
spread, while others do not?
There are several competing concepts that could help to answer this overarching 
question. A first is that of “interdiscourse” (Link 2013). Interdiscourses can be 
understood as a repertoire of collectively shared symbols, metaphors, icons, and 
narratives within a given discursive community (Farzin 2019). These collectively 
shared symbols enable and facilitate communication between specialized 
discourses and lay audiences. Farzin (2019) proposes to understand the genre 
of “climate fiction” as interdiscourse. By providing a set of powerful symbols 
and by turning complex scientific findings into simpler storylines, climate fiction 
serves as a translation device between expert and lay knowledge. At the same 
time, it is bound by the very (economic and discursive) structures through 
which it circulates. Interestingly, novels such as New York 2140 not only use 
scientific knowledge (e.g. the image of “dithering”) and turn it into a fictional 
narrative, but these narrative themselves then inform social theory once more 
as that knowledge becomes rearticulated by philosophers and social thinkers – 
including, for example, Wark (2016) and Haraway (2016).
Other collective symbols popularize metaphors such as the “tipping point,” 
“risk cascade,” or “threat multiplier” to break down the complexity of climate 
change-human security interlinkages (Scheffran 2019a; Rothe 2016). Stripple 
(2019) discusses the notion of “planetary boundaries” (Rockström et al. 2009), 
which has become the most powerful concept in the apocalyptic imaginary of 
climate change. In principle this imaginary is a discourse on limits, one which 
drives us to constantly search for the “safe level”: the limit to what the Earth 
system can ultimately deal with. Yet powerful visual images – including icons 
Explaining the Circulation of 
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such as the drowning Cologne Cathedral or the burning Earth – are also part of 
the interdiscourse. These dwell on and rearticulate powerful Christian icons of 
the biblical flood or the Last Judgment.
Farzin’s (2019) take on the interdiscourse as a medium of traveling imaginaries 
points toward a first circulation mechanism of violent climate imaginaries: 
translation. Following this argument, climate imaginaries circulate most 
successfully when they link up with the dominant interdiscursive concepts, 
symbols, icons, and metaphors. Interdiscourse allows imaginaries to be 
translated from one specialized discourse to another, and to be communicated 
to broader audiences.
A second explanation of the circulation of certain imaginaries is the broader 
political economy of imaginaries (Stripple 2019). As previously outlined by 
Scheffran et al. (2012), there is a high degree of disagreement within the research 
community on climate-security linkages. As global problems such as conflict 
and economic crisis are connected in complex ways with both each other and 
a range of other factors, of which climate change is but one, it is very difficult to 
statistically unpack the exact relationship between the latter phenomenon and 
violence. In light of this complexity, the question arises of why certain imaginaries 
of violent climate change – for example the idea of “climate wars” or of a looming 
“climate refugee crisis” – have become so prominent and circulated so widely 
even beyond the field of academia. According to Stripple (2019), the answer lies 
at least partly in the broader political economy of such imaginaries. Dissecting 
this would require studying the actor networks as well as the economic structures 
in which such imaginaries emerge and circulate. With regard to the imaginaries 
themselves, crucial questions would involve: What different changes in policy, 
spending, or organization do they argue for? Who benefits, and who does not? 
Which actors might have political and economic interests in circulating certain 
imaginaries? Asking these questions might also allow us to explain why climate-
skeptic imaginaries that conceive of climate change as a major liberal conspiracy 
– or “fake news” – have become so dominant in large parts of the US.
A third explanatory factor besides discursive translation and economic interests 
is the personal relations between actors of different fields. The militarization 
of the geosciences during the Cold War created novel actor networks and 
collaborations between (natural) scientists, military actors, and strategic thinkers 
(Rothe 2017). Institutions like RAND or MIT served as knowledge brokers to 
mediate between these fields. After the end of the Cold War, these actor networks 
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existing at the science-policy interface prevailed and became important drivers 
in the emerging debate on environmental security in the 1990s. Such networks 
have remained influential until today. For example, Scheffran (2019a, 2019b) 
points to the close cooperation of researchers and strategic thinkers within the 
field of geoengineering. One prominent figure in this debate is Lowell Wood, 
an astrophysicist and former advisor to Ronald Reagan; he is an advocate 
for defense-oriented, anti–climate change measures such as solar radiation 
management and space mirrors.4 
Finally, as outlined in more detail above the circulation of imaginaries can 
be explained by their coproduction in tandem with important technological 
developments. Social imaginaries become inscribed into technologies such as 
computer models or satellite remote sensing (Aykut 2019; Rothe 2017). Black-
boxed within computer models, data visualizations, maps, scenarios, or other 
similar techniques, certain imaginaries circulate more easily – and at the same 
time become harder to contest too. 
Conclusion
This research report has explored violent climate imaginaries at the intersection 
of science, fiction, and politics, particularly dwelling on the question of how 
they are produced and circulated within and between different fields. As we 
have shown, there are a multitude of approaches to and ways of understanding 
violence in such climate imaginaries. While often being an evident feature 
of dystopian climate futures (e.g. manifested in relation to climate-induced 
migration, starvation, natural disasters, etc.), violence is also part of more utopian 
visions of climate futures too – both as something to resist (e.g. the “sustainable 
livelihoods” imaginary) and as something rendered invisible (e.g. the “green-
tech” imaginary). Based on a discussion of different types of violence, we have 
been able to show that the dominant imaginaries tend to focus on the large-scale 
violence triggered by climate change. Slower, less visible forms of violence in 
relation to climate change, ones that are often felt by people in the non-Western 
world, are often silenced in these dominant imaginaries of the climatic future.
In terms of the production of imaginaries, we have proposed a typology of 
three different modes of future-making: modeling, writing, and visualizing 
violent climate futures. The first refers to numerical and calculative practices 
of anticipating future climates. Through computer models, probabilistic risk 
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assessments, or quantitative scenarios, the future becomes something that can 
be calculated and have numerical degrees of probability attached to it. Writing 
the future, on the contrary, refers to narrative practices in which the future is 
turned into a plausible storyline. Visualizing violent futures, meanwhile, refers to 
the power of images and other visuals – charts, figures, maps, or artwork – to 
render the future visible in the present. These three modes of future-making 
are, however, crucially interlinked. Computer models and other calculations are 
not neutral representations of reality but are imbued with interpretations and 
subjective beliefs that cohere with dominant narrative forms. Images are both 
the outcome of modeling practices and a source of inspiration for narrative 
accounts of the climatic future. Together, they shape our collective imaginations 
of future climate change. The resulting climate imaginaries turn the distant and 
abstract into something close, personal, and relatable. 
However, as shown in this paper, not all future imaginaries of climate change 
are equally influential. Their ability to shape political and personal choices in 
the present depend on their circulation between different knowledge domains 
and social fields. In this paper, four factors enabling imaginaries to circulate 
have been discussed: (1) the translation between discourse (expert knowledge) 
and interdiscourse (lay knowledge); (2) political economic processes; (3) actor 
network relationships; and, (4) technological coproduction. In the circulation 
of imaginaries, collectively shared symbols and narratives such as “tipping 
points” and “planetary boundaries” are key – in the sense of constructing and 
communicating meaning, both of the world as we know it today and of more 
uncertain futures. The notion of planetary boundaries, for instance, draws on a 
discourse on limits. It is particularly powerful as part of an apocalyptic imaginary 
telling us that if we do not manage to keep within the limits of the planet itself, 
hence within a “safe level” of altering the climate, we will inevitably encounter an 
increasingly violent and dystopian future.
The concept of violence in relation to climate change imaginaries is not, however, 
unproblematic. It might in fact be more relevant or useful to talk about injustices, 
rather than violence. The latter is normally something that we have respect for, but 
not necessarily something that we think about when talking about climate change 
events or effects. Injustice on the other hand – discussed in relation to a number 
of topics such as loss and damage, climate risks, vulnerability, and adaptation – 
is a persistent issue in the political discourse of climate change. In a world where 
climate change is already causing violent events that disproportionately affect 
the most vulnerable to (but least responsible for) climate change, there is a need 
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to increasingly turn attention to the injustices inherent in the broader political 
economy of climate change. 
This calls for further exploring questions of who benefits from certain imaginaries, 
and who does not. Or, more precisely, the issue of how the political economy of 
violent climate imaginaries affects structures of injustice and inequality. A further 
reservation concerns the Eurocentrism that undergirds the concept of (political) 
violence itself. The modernist notion of violence does not translate easily into other 
cultures, and in many non-Western languages there is not even an appropriate 
word to denote it. Nixon’s (2011) slow violence or non-anthropocentric concepts 
of violence could help to overcome this Western-centrism, but they seldom find 
their way into popular imaginaries of climate change. Popular culture, literature, 
and media discourses are still dominated by spectacular forms of violence such 
as war, societal collapse, or catastrophic disaster. 
Finally, further reflection on the legitimacy of violence in representations of 
climate change is needed: Is nonviolence a universal normative goal? Could 
certain forms of violence be legitimized in a situation of unchecked global 
warming? What is the role of state violence, given the responsibility of states 
to protect their citizens from physical harm? Questions like these are of the 
utmost political importance in the current situation of social protest and civil 
action against current climate legislation becoming more radicalized, and with 
the division of societies over matters of ecology and climate change seeming to 
be further reinforced.
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Endnotes
1 This workshop occurred as part of a larger cooperation scheme between  
 the Universities of Hamburg and Lund, and brought together scholars  
 from the fields of Sociology, Political Science, Peace and Security Studies,  
 Criminology, Human Geography, Literature Studies, and Sustainability  
 Science. We would like to thank Alina Viehoff for her support in the  
 organization of the workshop and Annika Reinke for  supporting the  
 production of this paper.
2 It is important to note that the discussed modes of future-making are  
 analytical ideal-types that necessarily overlap in empirical reality.
3 See: https://www.sciencealert.com/how-mit-computer-predicted-end- 
 civilisation-almost-50-years-ago-world1-world3-club-rome-limits-growth  
 (accessed 6 June 2019).
4 See, for example, “Can geoengineering save the world?” Rolling Stone,  
 4 October 2011.
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